Saturday, December 31, 2016

The PzKpfw III: Lord of the Blitzkrieg



Technically the PzKpfw III was, despite minor faults, a well-balanced basic design which left provision for up-gunning and up-armouring, but by 1942 it was incapable of further modification that would enable it to keep pace with the spiral of gun/armour race. During the high years of Blitzkrieg it was the only weapon in the German tank arsenal that really counted and thus, like Napoleon’s vieux moustaches, it did not merely witness history in the making-it made it, from Channel to the Volga and from the Arctic to the North African desert. This achievement has, perhaps, been overshadowed in recent years by the study of later and more dramatic German designs, but the fact remains that it was the PzKpfw III that brought Hitler closet to achieving his wildest dreams. - Brian Perrett


The Panzer III was the common name of a medium tank that was developed in the 1930s by Germany and was used extensively in World War II. The official German designation was Panzerkampfwagen III Sd Kfz. 141 (abbreviated to PzKpfw III) translating as "armored fighting vehicle number three".

The Panzer III was purpose designed to create a breakthrough on the battlefield and also to fight other armored fighting vehicles. The performance of the Panzer III was adequate in the early years of the war; however as the Germans came to face faced the formidable T-34 and KV-1 in Russia, it was immediately obvious that a stronger main gun with a considerably enhanced anti-tank capability was now needed. The Panzer IV had a bigger turret ring and was capable of mounting a larger main weapon, the traditional roles were therefore reversed. The Panzer IV mounted the long barreled 7.5 cm KwK 40 gun was detailed to fight in tank-to-tank battles, the Panzer III became obsolete in this role and for most purposes was supplanted by the Panzer IV. From 1942, the last version of Panzer III, Ausf. N, mounted the 7.5 cm KwK 37 L/24 short barelled howitzer better suited for infantry support. Production of the Panzer III ended in 1943. However, the Panzer III's capable chassis provided hulls for the Sturmgeschütz III until the end of the war.

Thursday, October 27, 2016

Sturmgeschütz 1943–1945




Along the entire Eastern Front the situation was dire. In Army Group Centre and Army Group North German forces were trying desperately to hold the Soviets back from breaking through their lines. Replacements continued to trickle through to help bolster the under strength Panzerwaffe. But in truth, the average new assault gunner that was freshly recruited was not as well trained as his predecessors during the early part of the campaign in Russia. Nevertheless, as with many StuG men they were characterized by high morale and a determination to do their duty.


In almost three months since the defeat at Kursk Army Centre and South had been pushed back an average distance of 150 miles on a 650 mile front. Despite heavy resistance in many sectors of the front the Soviets lost no time in exploiting the fruits of regaining as much territory as possible.


As the winter of 1943 approached there was a further feeling of despair and disbelief that the war had turned against the Germans. During this period there was an exasperating series of deliberations for the Panzerwaffe. Much of its concerns were preventing the awesome might of the Red Army with what little they had available at their disposal. Yet, the quality of the German infantry in late 1943 was no longer comparable to that at the beginning of the Russian campaign in June 1941.


Whilst drastic measures were made to ensure that infantry defended their lines the assault gun forces were still being frantically increased to help counter the massive setbacks. In 1943 some fifty-five percent of the Panzerwaffe comprised of assault guns. They were now found in numerous units. The divisions and brigades of the Waffen-SS which even had their own battery or even an entire unit. There were also a number of Luftwaffe divisions that had their own assault gun units like the famous Herman Goring Panzer-Korps. In the Wehrmacht for instance there were divisions with their own assault gun unit or battery. By the beginning of September 1943, Panzerjäger units of the various divisions also received their own assault gun units. This was undertaken in order to compensate for the lack of tanks and many of the Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions began absorbing many of the artillery assault gun units into the Panzer troops. However; although the assault guns continued to prove their worth within these units, equipping some of the Panzer units with assault guns did not operate well alongside the tank. Although commanders were well aware of the situation, they knew they had no choice. Instead, they continued using assault guns extensively in the Panzer units until the end of the war.


During this period they pushed the StuG further and deeper into the combat zone as an effective tank killer. In late 1943 and early 1944 the assault guns were increasingly equipping the Panzerjäger companies. The StuG continued to fight very effectively, in spite the ovewhelming resistance of the enemy. In many areas the front could not be held for any appreciable time and a slow withdrawal ensued much to the anger of Hitler.


Throughout January and February 1944 the winter did nothing to impede the Soviet might from grinding further west. During February the organization of an assault gun battery was changed consisting of four platoons, one of which had three 10.5cm assault howitzer 42 units. Three platoons each equipped with three 7.5cm assault cannon 40 units. Together with two assault guns of the battery leader, there were fourteen vehicles in each battery.


The alteration was supposed to make the gun batteries more effective on the battlefield. Whilst it increased the fire power crews still found they were numerically outnumbered and as a direct consequence still suffered heavy losses.


Yet, despite the setbacks, by the time the spring thaw arrived in March and early April 1944, there was a genuine feeling of motivation within the ranks of the assault gun units. There was renewed determination to keep the Red Army out of the Homeland. In addition, confidence was further bolstered by the efforts of the armaments industry as they begun producing many new vehicles for the Eastern Front. In fact during 1944 the Panzerwaffe were better supplied with equipment during any other time on the Eastern Front, thanks to the armaments industry. In total some 20,000 fighting vehicles including 8,328 medium and heavy tanks, 5,751 assault guns, 3,617 tank destroyers and 1,246 selfpropelled artillery carriages of various types reached the Eastern Front. Included in these new arrivals were the second generation of tank-destroyers, the Jagdpanzer IV, followed by the Hetzer and then the Jagpanther and Jagdtiger. In fact, tank-destroyers and assault guns now outnumbered the tanks, which was confirmation of the Panzerwaff’s obligation to performing a defensive role against overwhelming opposition. All of these vehicles would have to be irrevocably stretched along a very thin Eastern Front, with many of them rarely reaching the proper operating level.


By the spring of 1944 there was yet again a feeling of renewed confidence in the East. But by the summer as news reached the forward units that the Allies had landed on the northern shores of France on 6 June 1944, deep concerns began to fester on how they would be able to distribute their forces between two fronts. The problems became far greater during the third week of June when a new summer offensive by the Russians called ‘Operation Bagration’ was launched with its sole objective to annihilate Army Group Centre. Opposing the massive Russian force was three German armies with thirty-seven divisions, weakly supported by armour, against 166 divisions, supported by 2,700 tanks and 1,300 assault guns.


By the end of the first week of Bagration the three German armies had lost between them nearly 200,000 men and 900 tanks and assault guns; 9th Army and the 3rd Panzer Army were almost decimated. The remnants of the shattered armies trudged back west in order to try and rest and refit what was left of its Panzer units and build new defensive lines. Any plans to regain the initiative on the Eastern Front were doomed forever.


Although German commanders were fully aware of the fruitless attempts by its forces to establish a defensive line, Panzer and assault gun units followed instructions implicitly in a number of areas to halt the Soviet drive. Again and again the units fought to the grim death. Despite the huge losses and lack of reserves many still remained resolute stemming the Soviet drive east, even if it meant giving ground and fighting in Poland, which was regarded as the last defensive position before Germany.


During the summer of 1944 the Germans began defending Poland against the Soviet might. By September 1944, the whole position in Poland was on the point of disintegration. Action in Poland had been a grueling battle of attrition for those German units that had managed to escape from the slaughter Fortunately for the surviving German forces, the Soviet offensive had now run out of momentum. The Red Army’s troops were too exhausted, and their armoured vehicles were in great need of maintenance and repair. It seemed the Germans were spared from being driven out of Poland for the time being.


By late 1944 it became increasingly obvious that the assault gun, although built in huge numbers, were no longer as effective on the battlefield. Whilst the 7.5cm 40 L/40 gun was still regarded as a lethal weapon, the Russians had already developed newer and larger anti-tank killers of their own with greater armoured protection and better fire power. As a result the Russians continued pushing forward.


On 12 January 1945, the Eastern Front erupted with a massive advance as the 1st Ukrainian Front made deep wide-sweeping penetrations against hard-pressed German formations. The Russian offensive was delivered with so much weight and fury never before experienced on the Eastern Front. Two days later on 14 January, the 1st Belorrussian Front began its long awaited drive along the Warsaw-Berlin axis, striking out from the Vistula south of Warsaw. The city was quickly encircled and fell three days later. The frozen ground ensured rapid movement for the Russian tank crews, but in some areas these massive advances were halted for a time by the skilful dispositions of Panzer and Panzerjäger units. By this time the action strength of the Sturmgeschütz units had fallen to an all time low. Losses of equipment too had increased markedly in the course of the retreat combat. Often assault gun crews would abandon their vehicles when they ran out of fuel and were seen regularly running on foot or hitching a lift onboard other StuG vehicles.


In early 1945, production figures dropped, and as a result of this decline units no longer had any reserves on which to rely on. When defensive fighting began in Germany there was a severe lack of fuel, spare parts, and the lack of trained crews. When parts of the front caved the remaining assault gun units were often forced to destroy their equipment, so nothing was left for the conquering enemy. The Germans no longer had the manpower, war plant or transportation to accomplish a proper build-up of forces on the Oder Commanders could do little to compensate for the deficiencies, and in many sectors of the front they did not have any coherent planning in the event of any defensive position being lost.


During the last days of the war most of the remaining assault guns continued to fight as a unit until they destroyed their equipment and surrendered. At the time of surrender, the combined strength of the entire Panzerwaffe was 2,023 tanks, 738 assault guns and 159 Flakpanzers. Surprisingly this was the same strength that was used to attack Russia in 1941. But the size of German Army in 1945 was not the same; it was far too inadequate in strength for any type of task. Although the war had ended, the Panzerwaffe still existed, but not as the offensive weapon they were in the early Blitzkrieg years.


Nobody could deny that the assault gun proved itself to be a decisive weapon on the battlefield. In the first years of the war it had been an effective offensive weapon protecting the infantry from enemy tank units and clearing a path for them to advance. However, as the war changed the assault gun was compelled to evolve into that of a tank destroyer. Despite great success in action, the StuG was unable to overcome the huge array of Russian armour, and as a consequence incurred high losses.


But in spite the massive losses sustained the assault gun crews had won a reputation for daring and professionalism in combat. The titanic struggles which had been placed upon them during the war in Russia and on the Western Front provided the very backbone of Germany’s armoured and infantry defence until the very end of the war.

Friday, August 19, 2016

Panzerkampfwagen III (PzkPfw III) or SdKfz 141


It was envisaged in the mid-1930s that each German tank battalion would have three companies of relatively light medium tanks and one company of better armed and armored medium tanks. The former eventually became the Panzerkampfwagen III (PzkPfw III) or SdKfz 141, while the latter became the Panzerkampfwagen IV (PzKpfw IV) which was to remain in production throughout World War II. In 1935 the Weapons Department issued contracts for the construction of prototype vehicles against the lighter concept to Daimler-Benz, Krupp, MAN and Rheinmetall-Borsig. At an early stage it was decided to arm the tank with a 37-mm gun which would fire the same ammunition as that used by the infantry anti-tank gun, but provision was made that the turret ring diameter be large enough to permit the up gunning of the vehicle to 50 mm if this should be required.

Following trials with the prototype vehicles the Daimler-Benz model was selected, although the first three production models, the PzKpfw III Ausf A, PzKpfw III Ausf B and PzKpfw III Ausf C were built only in small numbers, differing from each other mainly in suspension details, In September 1939 the vehicle was formally adopted for service, and mass production was soon under way, The PzKpfw III was first used in combat during the invasion of Poland, The next production models were the PzKpfw III Ausf D and PzKpfw III Ausf F, the former with thicker armor and a revised cupola, and the latter with an up rated engine and only six road wheels. In 1939 it was decided to push ahead with the 50-mm model and this entered production in 1940 under the designation PzKpfw III Ausf F. This was followed by the PzKpfw III Ausf G version with similar armament but more powerful engine. For operations in North Africa the vehicles were fitted with a tropical kit, while for the proposed invasion of England a special version for deep wading was developed. The latter were never used for their intended role but some were successfully used during the invasion of the USSR in 1941.

The PzKpfw Aus H introduced wider tracks and a number of important improvements, The 50-mm L/42 gun was inadequate to cope with the Soviet T-34 tank, so the longer-barrelled KwK 39 L/60 weapon was installed. This had a higher muzzle velocity, and vehicles fitted with the weapon were designated PzKpfw III Ausf J. Many vehicles were retrofitted with the 50-mm gun, and by early 1942 the 37-mm version had almost disappeared from frontline service. The next model was the PzKpfw III Ausf L, which had greater armor protection, pushing its weight up to just over 22 tonnes, almost 50 per cent more than the weight of the original prototype. The PzKpfw III Ausf M and PzKpfw III Ausf N were fitted with the 75-mm L/24 gun which had been installed in the PzKpfw IV; a total of 64 rounds of ammunition were carried for this gun.

Production of the PzKpfw III was finally completed in August 1943. The chassis was also used as the basis for the 75-mm assault gun (Gepanzerte Selb stahrlafette für Sturmgeschütz 7.5 cm Kanone or SdKfz 142), of which a few were used in the invasion of France in 1941; production of improved SP guns on PzKpfw III chassis continued until the end of World War II. Other variants included an armored recovery vehicle, an armoured observation vehicle (Panzerbeobachtungswagen) and a command vehicle (Panzerbefehlswagen III), A total of 15,000 chassis was produced for both the tank and assault gun applications.

The layout of the PzKpfw III was basically the same in all vehicles, with the driver at the front of the hull on the left and the machine gunner/radio operator to his right. The three man turret was in the center of the hull, the commander having a cupola in the center of the roof at the rear. The engine was at the rear of the hull, and the suspension, which was of the torsion bar type from the PzKpfw III Ausf E, consisted on each side of six small road wheels, with the drive sprocket at the front and the idler at the rear; there were three track return rollers.

Panzer III Colours Blitzkrieg


Tuesday, March 15, 2016

Fighting for Chatkowo





Heinrich Eberbach, Commander of the 5. Panzer-Brigade
The 4. Panzer-Division had reached the last attack objective assigned to it in 1941—the Tula-Serpuchow road—on 4 December, with its lead tank elements approaching from the east. The XXXXIII. Armee-Korps had been directed to advance there from the west, thus encircling Tula. Only 5 kilometers separated the two corps; from there, it was only an additional 80 kilometers to Moscow. But the thermometer sank to -37 [-34.6]. Guderian’s light infantry from Goslar, who were supposed to link up with us, were bled white and got frostbite. And we did not have any fuel to advance any farther in their direction. The engines would not turn over, the optics were fogged up on the inside and the breechblocks of the guns no longer could be opened.

The Siberian divisions attacked us from the north. They had been brought forward by the Russians, wearing their wonderful winter uniforms. Just to the south of our brigade command post were 60 Russian T-34’s, ready to crush us. Did they have any fuel?

At that point, the corps issued the order to retreat. Despite the desperate situation, no one wanted to believe it. In three years of war, we had only attacked. And retreat without fuel? That meant we had to blow up our magnificent old Panzer III/IV tanks, our guns, and our vehicles, which could not overcome the icy slopes. No, we did not want to go back. And we said it loudly and not just once. But the order was firm: Blow up the tanks and the guns and immediately initiate the retreat.

It was only gradually that we heard about the situation facing the German field armies. They were having to pull back everywhere in the face of the more than 40 Siberian divisions and the newly formed Russian tank brigades.

Retreat as far as Mzensk! Vehicles of all types were in the way. The temperature as always between -20 and -40 [-4 and -40]. The shadows of Napoleon’s Grande Armée hung over us. The infantry still had their thin little overcoats on; bread froze in your pants pocket, where you also placed your rifle and machine-gun bolt.

But there was also bright spots. The combat forces of the 4. Panzer-Division had clothed themselves thanks to the Siberian forces. When it was so cold out, you accepted the lice as part of the bargain. Suddenly, we had long columns of sleds pulled by panje horses—a motorcycle that wouldn’t start anymore on one; an infantry gun on another.

As a result of the retreat, a gap of 40 kilometers was torn open between the XXXXIII. Armee-Korps and the XXIV. Armee-Korps (mot.). A flood of Russian forces poured into the area between Belew and Kaluga. If they reached Smolensk and Rosslawl, there would be no more supplies for us.

Even if the Landser did not know that, the retreat shook their self-confidence.

The regiments had long since been consolidated into battalions. Despite that, the companies only had end strengths of between 40 and 60 men. Panzer-Regiment 35 had only one company. The black men without tanks were supposed to be employed as infantry.

Kradschützen-Bataillon 34 was consolidated with Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 7. The most combat-proven armored reconnaissance men were employed as infantry. Rittmeister Bradel led that unit. Even in the most humble of circumstances, he always looked spic and span.

Our artillery had barely half of its guns left and just a third of its prime movers. The situation was similar with regard to the engineers and the antitank battalion.

On top of all that was the fact that they had taken away the commander-in-chief of our 2. Panzer-Armee, the brilliant General Guderian, with whom everyone had felt a kinship. He had ordered the retreat on his own initiative, wherever it had been necessary to spare blood. For this, he had lost his command.

The leather footgear was sheer torture at -40 [-40]. In some cases, we could get felt boots from Ivan, but it was only the combat forces who could do so. The rear-area services were still stuck like the infantry in their tattered summer uniforms.

Logistics was no longer working, because the trucks had been worn out and they would no longer start up when it was so cold. That often led to shortages of ammunition and rations. Signals communications was also lacking, because many of the trucks had been lost and the equipment also had snags in the cold weather.

For that reason, the landlines took on a greater importance. But laying lines during that type of weather and in snow that came up to your chest cost unbelievable energy. Wherever the sleds could not get through, the heavy weapons had to be carried.

The transition from motor transport to horse transport was also difficult—from mechanic to the driver of horses. Frequently, the panje horse had a different mind than its master, who first had to learn how to handle the animal and take care of it. The noncommissioned officers, who had transferred in from horse regiments, received unexpected honors.

The soldiers quickly learned to observe one another to prevent frostbite. For that reason, only two-man posts were manned, which had to be relieved every half hour due to the cold. Our enemy, on the other hand, was conditioned to the winter and used to the cold. He attacked with ski companies—also at night—and from the rear, camouflaged with snow jackets.

But there was no time to cry in our beer. Orel, the logistics base for two field armies, was being threatened. The Russians broke through the 112. Infanterie-Division at Christmas, and their men were massacred in a brutal fashion. As a result, our 4. Panzer-Division had to play “fire brigade” from 26 December 1941 to 1 January 1942 north of Belew and northeast of Bolchow.

The interplay between motorized and horse-drawn was quickly learned. When it was necessary, motor sergeants became feed masters. Instead of using grease, which turned hard in the cold, they used petroleum jelly to make the machine guns function.

The miracle happened: The thin ranks of the 4. Panzer-Division drove the enemy from village after village in temperatures ranging from -20 to -40 [-4 to -40] in a chest-deep snow. It took back the positions along the Oka. But then our new division commander, Oberst von Saucken, was badly wounded in the head. As he had so many times with his rifle brigade, he had been leading from the front. Oberst Eberbach was designated as his successor.

With their grim wit, on 1 January 1942, our Landser wished me Hals- und Bauchschuß.

Strong elements of the division—Kampfgruppe von Lüttwitz—received a new mission. Elements of an infantry division that had been brought in from warm France had been cut off and surrounded by the Russians 120 kilometers north-northeast of Brjansk. Gruppe von Gilsa, with 5,000 men and 1,000 wounded, had been encircled in Suchinitischi. The mission was to relieve them.

Starting on 16 January, Kampfgruppe von Lüttwitz—reinforced by two battalions of infantry, some artillery and engineers, and later joined by elements of Schützen-Regiment 12, which had been brought over from the Oka—attacked to the left of the 18. Panzer-Division. It moved into the areas designated as its attack objectives: Kotobitsch, Liudinowo, Simnizi and Slobotka. I can still remember seeing them move out in a snowstorm with icicles hanging from their eyebrows and noses, bent over close to their panje horses, if they had them. Despite everything, Kampfgruppe von Lüttwitz reached its attack objective on 22 January, moving through partisan territory and engaging in difficult house-to-house fighting. Gruppe von Gilsa was relieved, the wounded evacuated and Suchinitschi then abandoned. Kampfgruppe von Lüttwitz then transitioned to the defense.

In the meantime, Panzer-Regiment 35—minus any tanks—had assumed the duties of protecting the rail line from Brjansk to the north. The only tank company left was Wollschlaeger’s, with up to 10 tanks at any given time. Perhaps I should say old crates instead of tanks? After all, there were only a few Panzer III/IV’s among them. Later on, he was joined by Kästner’s company, when the hard-working maintenance facility repaired another six tanks.

The fighting was over small localities. At -40 [-40}, even the Russians could not stay outside forever. That meant the taking or destruction of the enemy’s quarters was of decisive importance.

All of our battalions established ski platoons. That meant we had motorized elements, sled elements, foot elements and ski elements. Such a force is not easily led. For newly arriving officers it seemed an impossible mission. But we adjusted to the task. On 8 January, the division reported to the corps that it consisted of 50% foot elements. There was an infantry company composed of artillerymen. Our Artillerie-Regiment 103 had only nine guns on that day; of those, five could not be moved because of the loss of prime movers. The antitank battalion had only three heavy and five light antitank cannon.

Our Panzer-Pionier-Bataillon 79 had only 10 squads. The I./Nebelwerfer-Regiment 53, which had been attached to us, had only four launchers and 120 rounds. The few supply vehicles we had left were often stuck in snow banks for up to 12 hours.

After releasing Kampfgruppe von Lüttwitz, the division assembled what was left of its forces in the area around Chwastowitschi in tiresome marches lasting until 21 January. Mission: Clear the west bank of the Reseta by thrusting to the north. The division had the following at its disposal:
Headquarters of Schützen-Regiment 33 (Grolig) with Bradel’s battalion
I./Infanterie-Regiment 446 from the 211. Infanterie-Division
Feld-Ersatz-Bataillon 84
3./Kradschützen-Bataillon 40
Artillery-Infantry Company of Artillerie-Regiment 103 (mot.)
Wollschlaeger’s and Kästner’s tank companies - Panzer III/IV
Regiment headquarters of Artillerie-Regiment 103 with six batteries
The I. and III./Artillerie-Regiment 134
1 Nebelwerfer battery
Pionier-Bataillon 41
Pionier-Bataillon 10 (minus one company)
3./Panzer-Pionier-Bataillon 79
3./Panzerjäger-Abteilung 49
Later on, these forces were joined by:
Regimental headquarters and the III./Infanterie-Regiment 446
I./Infanterie-Regiment 317
III./Infanterie-Regiment 445 (211. Infanterie-Division)

The field-replacement battalion had only 140 men; the I./Artillerie-Regiment 134 had only four guns. The strengths of the other elements were analogous. Infanterie-Regiment 446 had no experience in the east.

On 22 January, it was -44 [-47.2]. A platoon from Infanterie-Regiment 446 was wiped out by Russian cavalry and partisans. Tanks and infantry eliminated those enemy forces.

The enemy had placed strong forces in Dudorowskij, Moilowo and Brusny. On 23 January, strong enemy forces entered Kzyn. They were ejected by means of an immediate counterattack.

On 25 January, the corps proposed an attack on Chatkowo. It was -40 [-40]. The division expressed concern due to the continued difficult supply situation. On 26 January, the division commander conducted a leader’s reconnaissance—some of it on skis—on the terrain for the designated attack.

On 28 January, our 4. Panzer-Division took Moilowo, Ssuseja and Brusny through the commitment of the I./Infanterie-Regiment 446, Pionier-Bataillon 42, the 2./Pionier-Bataillon 10, the 3./Kradschützen-Bataillon 40, one artillery battery and Wollschlaeger’s company. During the effort to take Chatkowo by means of a coup de main, Wollschlaeger lost three Panzer IIIs to mines and antitank guns.

The snowstorm continued on 29 January. It slowed down all movement. Our reconnaissance on sleds had to be abandoned, since the horses were sinking up to their stomachs. The friendly forces on the right were the 134. Infanterie-Division and, on the left, the 211. Infanterie-Division.

On 31 January, it was directed that the 211. Infanterie-Division and our 4. Panzer-Division take Chatkowo. Pionier-Bataillon 41, reinforced by the 3./ Kradschützen-Bataillon 40 and supported by a battery of artillery and two Nebelwerfer, attacked Chatkowo at 0800 hours in a snowstorm. The attack made it into the outskirts, but then failed by 1600 hours, because the locality was defended by the entire Russian 1107th Rifle Regiment of the 232nd Rifle Division, supported by artillery and heavy weapons. The attackers had to wade through snow up to their stomachs. Losses: 2 dead and 15 wounded. The 211. Infanterie-Division was unable to take Klinzy.

The division reported: Large-scale offensive operations are no longer possible due to the high snow. Answer from the corps: New attack on Chatkowo. The enemy’s bridgehead over the Reseta had to be eliminated as soon as conditions allowed. The snowstorm continued to rage on 1 February. Despite that, the III./Infanterie-Regiment 445, reinforced by a company from Pionier-Bataillon 10, took Trosna. All available forces were used to clear snow along the supply routes. Helping in that effort as far as Chwastowitschi was a snowplow from the field army. The corps continued to press for an attack on Chatkowo.

Starting on 2 February, the following forces were moved forward to Ssusseja in stages: Headquarters of Schützen-Regiment 33 with the attached Kradschützen-Bataillon 34/Panzeraufklärungs-Abteilung 7, Pionier-Bataillon 41 and the I./Artillerie-Regiment 134. There, the following elements remained attached to the regiment: Wollschlaeger’s Panzer III/IV company, the 3./Kradschützen-Bataillon 40, the 2./Pionier-Bataillon 10 and the I./Nebelwerfer-Regiment 53. The following elements were moved to Milejewo: 8./Artillerie-Regiment 103 and a company from Pionier-Bataillon 10. Elements of the 211. Infanterie-Division were attached to Schützen-Regiment 33 for the attack. One can see from the organization the jumble of elements from different divisions, from which the smallest unit to the largest formation were thrown together out of necessity in order to plug the most dangerous gaps. The average snow depth off the roads on that day was one meter; drifts, including the roads, reached up to 1.8 meters, that is, higher than a man.

The snowstorm stopped on 3 February. Even with the snowplows from the field army, the clearing of the roads remained difficult. Even the Panzer III/IV were restricted to the roads under those conditions. Otherwise, they’d bottom out on their hulls. But the roads were mined. Bringing the artillery forward also proved difficult. For those reasons, the third attack on Chatkowo was postponed by the division for another day. The division command post was moved forward to Berestna. The division commander did not want to attack without sufficient ammunition. He wanted to do everything to ensure that the men entrusted to him were not confronted with a mission that was impossible to accomplish. As a result, all available forces were used to clear the roads leading to the front until the ammunition could roll forward.

The following participated in the attack on Chatkowo: Bradel’s reinforced battalion attacked from the east and the southeast; Buddeberg’s reinforced battalion (Pionier-Bataillon 41, 3./Kradschützen-Bataillon 40, the 2./Pionier-Bataillon 10 and a few heavy weapons from Infanterie-Regiment 446) attacked from a southwesterly direction and the I./Infanterie-Regiment 317 from the 211. Infanterie-Division attacked simultaneous from the west from Leschowo. Supporting the attack from the Ssusseja area were the I./Artillerie-Regiment 134 and the 8./Artillerie-Regiment 103 (mot.).

The preparations for the attack were made so that each of the three attack battalions would attack Chatkowo at 0800 hours. The division’s armored signals battalion established land lines to all three of the attack groups. The division commander moved forward on 5 February. He moved far enough forward on skis with his liaison officer that he was able to observe the attack starting at 1030 hours.

Chatkowo is a large village, split into several parts by defiles. Our artillery fired with exactness. The men of the motorcycle/reconnaissance battalion pushed their way towards the village from the east through the belly-high snow. The enemy defended with artillery, machine-gun and mortar fires. But the motorcycle infantry did not allow themselves to be held up. They entered the first houses. They slowly worked their way into the village with hand grenades. The enemy was strong.

Where was Pionier-Bataillon 41, which had so often proven itself? Where was the I./Infanterie-Regiment 317? Even at 1200 hours, nothing was to be seen of them from the observation post! If the motorcycle infantry and reconnaissance soldiers were left by themselves, then that magnificent battalion, which had already accomplished so much, would be left to be bled white. The division commander hastened back. With all of the signals means at his disposal and his liaison officers, he hounded the remaining battalions not to leave their comrades in the lurch. The artillery was informed of the nasty situation. That day, they fired 100 light and 160 heavy howitzer rounds.

In fact, it turned out that Pionier-Bataillon 41 had moved out from the south at 1100 hours. It was advancing slowly through the high snow and cleared the village from the west. The Panzer III/IVs were positioned in front of the mine obstacle. They could only function as artillery.

But the infantry was still bogged down along the wood line, even though the Russians were already pulling back to the north with two battalions and two guns so as not to get caught. The battalion finally attacked and reached the northwestern edge of Chatkowo at 1500 hours. The house-to-house fighting in the middle of the village and along its northeastern outskirts continued until 1630 hours, when Chatkowo was finally in our hands.

If the infantry had moved out at the right time, then a considerable victory could have been won. As it was, it was an ordinary victory, which was entirely thanks to Kradschützen-Bataillon 40/Panzeraufklärungs-Abteilung 7.

Oberleutnant Lembke in Kradschützen-Bataillon 40 was killed; two other officers were wounded and 60 noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel killed or wounded. Despite the losses suffered by the weak battalion, it was able to wrest Chatkowo from a reinforced Russian regiment, thanks to its inner superiority and the example of its officers. The retreat was over. We had attacked again, despite winter and the loss of the equipment.

On 11 February, Infanterie-Regiment 446, reinforced by Kästner’s tank company, took Dudorowski. Wesniny and Stowrowo were taken on 12 February. The 211. Infanterie-Division took Klinzy on 13 February; on 15 February, Infanterie-Regiment 446 Simowka; on 16 February, the I./Infanterie-Regiment 445 Poljanskij. In each instance, both of our two tanks companies participated.

On 20 February, the corps ordered a transition to the defense. Chatkowo remained in the front lines and was improved accordingly. Just on 6 March 1942 alone, the Russians fired 360 artillery rounds on Chatkowo.